Eskom, the South African state-owned power utility, is one of the largest employers in South Africa. It provides electricity to around 95% of the population, and its revenues are almost equal to that of the country’s government.

Eskom employs a team of over 39000 people, making it one of the largest employers in South Africa. The company has been under pressure for some time due to a lack of leadership and poor management practices, but these issues seem to be improving under new management.

The company has struggled with power shortages since 2008 and is currently working on a new plan to address these issues. The plan will require more than $19 billion in investment over the next five years, but it has been approved by regulators and may help keep Eskom alive until 2030.

Electrical Engineer Salary At Eskom

Eskom is a South African electricity public utility. It was established in 1923 as the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) and also known by its Afrikaans name Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie (EVKOM), by the South African government and people of the Republic of South Africa in terms of the Electricity Act (1922). South Africa became a republic in the 1960s. Eskom represents South Africa in the Southern African Power Pool. The utility is the largest producer of electricity in Africa,[2][3] and was among the top utilities in the world in terms of generation capacity and sales, but has since slipped in both categories. It is the largest of South Africa’s state owned enterprises. Eskom operates a number of notable power stations, including Matimba Power Station and Medupi Power Station in Lephalale, Kusile Power Station in Witbank, Kendal Power Station, and Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in the Western Cape Province, the only nuclear power plant in Africa.

The company is divided into Generation, Transmission and Distribution divisions, and together Eskom generates approximately 95% of electricity used in South Africa, amounting to ~45% used in Africa,[4] and emits 42% of South Africa’s total greenhouse gas emissions.[5][6][7][8] By releasing 1.6 million tons of sulfur dioxide into the air in 2019, Eskom is also the largest emitter of sulfur dioxide in the power industry in the world.[9] In 2019, it was announced that Eskom was to be split up into three distinct nationally owned entities due to huge debts and poor reliability of supply.[10]

At the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference, a deal was announced for rich countries to fund South Africa’s transition from coal power to renewable energy. However, employment in the mining sector threatens this transition.[11]

Contents
1 History
1.1 First expansion period: 1960-1994
1.2 Post-1994 election period: 1994-2007
1.3 Energy crisis and second expansion: 2007-present
1.4 Logos
2 Restructuring efforts
2.1 Transmission
2.2 COSATU response
2.3 Job losses
3 Installed capacity
3.1 Subscribers
3.2 Fossil fueled power stations
3.3 Renewable and nuclear power stations
3.4 Future projects
3.5 Investment in renewables
3.5.1 South Africa’s integrated resource plan
3.5.2 Investment in renewables, hydro, wind, solar
4 Corporate affairs
4.1 Financials
4.1.1 Debt
4.1.1.1 Chinese debt
5 Controversies
5.1 Municipal debts
5.1.1 Soweto
5.2 Zimbabwe Power Exports
5.3 Power shortage: 2007 – ongoing
5.3.1 Sabotage
5.4 2017 corruption scandal
5.5 Price increases
6 See also
7 Notes
8 References
9 Further reading
10 External link

In January 2008, Eskom controversially introduced “load shedding” – planned rolling blackouts based on a rotating schedule, in periods where short supply threatened the integrity of the grid. Demand-side management has focused on encouraging consumers to conserve power during peak periods in order to reduce the incidence of load shedding. Following the national power shortage in 2007, Eskom embarked on an aggressive electricity production expansion programme during the administration of President Jacob Zuma. The Zuma administration decided to focus expansion efforts on building additional large scale six-pack coal-fired power plants.[18]

In 2016, Eskom stated it intended to pursue a nuclear solution to the country’s energy shortage. According to projections from late 2016, the use of nuclear power would provide over 1000GW of power by 2050. In preparation, the company launched a training program for 100 technicians, engineers and artisans that would certify them as nuclear operators.[19] In January 2018, Eskom’s acting chief financial officer stated that the company could not afford a new build, following a 34% drop in interim profits due to declining sales and increasing financing costs. The government stated it would proceed with the plan but more slowly.[20]

In 2017, Eskom was the focus of a major corruption scandal involving the Gupta family and the administration of then President Jacob Zuma.

The National Energy Regulator of South Africa denied an application by Eskom to increase electricity tariffs by a future 19.9% for the financial year 2018/19. The regulator instead granted a 5.2% increase and gave a list of reasons for the refusal to grant higher tariffs that the South African newspaper Business Day stated painted “a picture of inefficiency, inaccurate forecasting and cost overruns” at the power utility. Part of the refusal was the finding that Eskom had 6,000 more employees than needed, costing the company R3.8 billion annually.[21]

In February 2019, shortly after the announcement by government that the company would be broken up, Eskom initiated another round of emergency load shedding. Eskom stated that the 2019 load shedding was initiated due to breakdowns at power stations as well as the depletion of water and diesel resources. Other reasons cited included legacy issues from state capture corruption, coal availability, and that new power plants such as Medupi and Kusile were not yet operational.[22][23] Corruption during the Zuma administration had been noted as a major factor in the cost overruns and long delays in completing Medupi and Kusile power plants that had a knock-on effect leading to the 2019 power shortages.[23] The power shortage and related troubles at Eskom was blamed as a significant contributing factor to a 3.2% decline in GDP growth in the first quarter of 2019,[24] prompting fears of a recession in 2019.[25] Between March and July 2020 the power supply was stable due to reduced demand during the COVID-19 lockdown,[26] but on 12 July a new round of level 2 load shedding began due to the breakdown of generating units.[27]

Logos
Eskom’s logo has been an integral symbol of the company since its founding. For a brief period in 1986 Eskom had no logo when it was moving away from the company’s original logo of stylised letters spelling “ESC” within a circle to the more contemporary version with a blue shield with a stylised lightning bolt in its center. The 1987 logo was replaced in 2002 with its current logo that replaced the shield with a circle but otherwise kept the logo as it was.

1923

1987

2002

Restructuring efforts
“Eskom’s sales have been declining by about 1% per annum. The less it sells, the higher the tariff it wants, and the less it sells – the utility death spiral.”

• Rod Crompton, Adjunct professor African Energy Leadership Centre Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand[28]

In December 1998, a white paper prepared by the Department of Minerals and Energy recommended that the government restructure Eskom into separate generation and transmission businesses. Although the report predicted that this action would improve power supply and reliability, it was never enacted.[29]

In February 2019, these plans were resurrected during the State of the Nation address. President Ramaphosa announced that the government would be splitting Eskom up into three new state-owned entities focusing on generation, transmission and distribution.[10] This was done so as to better manage the serious operational and financial problems facing the company. By the time of the speech Eskom had a total debt burden of R419 billion[10] (US$30.8 billion) and was entering a death spiral whereby there was not enough revenue to make debt repayments.[28]

In a February 2019 briefing, the Department of Public Enterprises stated that Eskom was “technically insolvent” and would not be able to operate past the next three months if it did not receive additional loans.[30] Finance Minister Tito Mboweni then announced in his 2019 budget speech that government would be providing a R69 billion rand (US$5 billion) bail-out to Eskom over a three-year period so as to stabilise the company’s serious financial situation.[31]

Transmission
The transmission entity would be given its own board, by 31 March 2020 in which the transmission legal entity would be responsible for hearing legislative amendments in accordance to government law. This new transmission entity would involve up to 6,000 people that are responsible of setting up thousands of miles of “wires” and transmission lines that would ensure electricity from the power stations to where power is needed.[32] As part of the Transmission Development Plan (TDP) for 2020–2029 Eskom has plans to increase its transmission infrastructure by approximately 4,800 km of extra high voltage transmission lines, and over 35,000 MVA of transformer capacity over the next 10 years. This new outline of reconstructing Eskom comes from new regulatory guidelines from the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) to publish an annual TDP report.[citation needed]

COSATU response
In response to feared job losses resulting from the breakup the trade union COSATU organised a national strike and called for a moratorium on retrenchments in the private and public sectors.[33][34][35] This caused to the apparent abandonment of the government’s company breakup and restructuring plans.[34][36] In July 2019 the outgoing Eskom CEO announced that Eskom had entered a “death spiral” and highlighted the need for the company to restructure.[36][37] Following the appointment of de Ruyter as Eskom CEO trade unions National Union of Mineworkers and Solidarity stated that they would fight any government restructuring efforts that might result in job losses.[38]

In December 2019 COSATU suggested that money be used from the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) to reduce Eskom’s debt from around R450 billion to more manageable levels.[39] In return COSTATU proposed a number of conditions that included keeping workers employed.[40] The trade union Solidarity was strongly apposed to the COSATU proposal arguing that it put the pensions of public employees at risk.[41] The country’s second biggest trade union, the Federation of Unions of South Africa, was also skeptical of COSATU’s proposed plan.[42]

Job losses
Between 2020 and 2021, two thousand employees lost their jobs at the power utility. 6000 more jobs are reportedly at risk in order for the company to continue operating.[43]

Installed capacity
Main article: List of power stations in South Africa
Subscribers
Eskom – the only electricity utility in the country – has 16,789,974 subscribers in South Africa, comprising about one-third of the population.

Fossil fueled power stations
Power plant Province Type Date commissioned
(planned) Capacity (MW)
(planned) Status Notes
Acacia Power Station Western Cape Gas turbine 1976 171 Operational [44]
Ankerlig Power Station Western Cape Gas turbine 2007 1,338 Operational [45]
Arnot Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1971-1975 2,352 Operational [46][47]
Camden Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1967-1969;
2005-2008 1,561 Operational [47][48]
Duvha Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1980-1984 3,600 Operational [47][49][50]
Gourikwa Power Station Western Cape Gas turbine 2007 746 Operational [45]
Grootvlei Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1969-1977;
2008-2011 1,180 Operational [47][51]
Hendrina Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1970-1976 1,893 Operational [47][52]
Kendal Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1988-1992 4,116 Operational [47][53][54]
Komati Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1961-1966;
2009-2013 990 Operational [47][55]
Kriel Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1976-1979 3,000 Operational [47][56][57]
Kusile Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired (2017–2025) 3,200 (4,800) 4/6 units operational [58][59][60][61][62]
Lethabo Power Station Free State Coal-fired 1985-1990 3,708 Operational [47][63]
Majuba Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1996–2001 4,110 Operational [47][64][65][unreliable source?]
Matimba Power Station Limpopo Coal-fired 1987-1991 3,990 Operational [47][66]
Matla Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1979-1983 3,600 Operational [47][67]
Medupi Power Station Limpopo Coal-fired 2015–2019 4,764 Operational [60][68][69][61][62]
Port Rex Power Station Eastern Cape Gas turbine 1976 171 Operational [44]
Tutuka Power Station Mpumalanga Coal-fired 1985-1990 3,654 Operational [47][70]
Renewable and nuclear power stations

Eskom Generation’s pilot wind farm facility at Klipheuwel in the Western Cape, South Africa.
Power plant Province Type Date
commissioned Installed
capacity (MW) Status Notes
Colley Wobbles Power Station Eastern Cape Hydroelectric 1984 42 Operational
Drakensberg Pumped Storage Scheme Free State Hydroelectric 1981 1,000 Operational [71]
Gariep Dam Free State-Eastern Cape border Hydroelectric 1971 360 Operational [72]
Ingula Pumped Storage Scheme KwaZulu-Natal Hydroelectric 2017 1,332 Operational
[61][73]
Koeberg Power Station Western Cape Nuclear 1984 1,860 Operational [74][75]
Ncora Dam Eastern Cape Hydroelectric 1972 2.1 Operational [76]
Palmiet Pumped Storage Scheme Western Cape Hydroelectric 1988 400 Operational [77][78]
Sere Wind Farm Western Cape Wind Jan 2015 100 Operational [79][80][81][82]
Vanderkloof Dam Northern Cape Hydroelectric 1977 240 Operational
Future projects
Eskom has a number of planned infrastructure projects to further expand electrical production.

Tubatse Pumped Storage Scheme – 1500MWe
Wind 500 – 550MWe
Tasakoolo Wind farm 200 – 200Mwe
Investment in renewables
As of October 2019 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd issued a tender to introduce 20 three-phase KW inverters and mountains structures. These structures are planned to distribute power to four power plants, and would introduce Eskom into the solar energy market. The African Investment Forum has announced that it has raised over $40.1 billion in investment into developing new infrastructure, related to renewable energies.[83] This is aimed to help distance itself from Eskom coal power plants, and to focus more on wind and solar developments. The African investment forum is backed up by corporate organizations and lenders, private donors, and the African Development Bank.[84]

These new inverters would be align with South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP).[citation needed]

South Africa’s integrated resource plan
The IRP supports a diverse energy mix with policy aimed to help aim to meet the need of South Africa’s energy goals. The Integrated Resource Plan supports electrical infrastructure developments with an aim focused on renewable energy sources.[85] These new investments are directed towards more high efficiency, low emission standards with an emphasis on solar technologies in which 6,000 MW of new Solar PV capabilities and 14,400 MW of new wind power technologies.[86] With renewable energies, the IRP plans to increase its investment in hydro-electric power.[87]

Investment in renewables, hydro, wind, solar
With failing power plants and coal not working as a viable solution, progress towards a greener future is in sight for South Africa. In agreement to the Paris Agreement, South Africa needs to reduce its carbon emission and cut-back from being dependent on Coal. There is new US$11 Billion Green-Energy Initiative aimed at the development of solar and wind. This new initiative would allow loans to Eskom and below commercial rates on conditions that it would accelerate its closure of power plants and to start building renewable energy structures.[88] This plan takes the steps in moving away from coal, and investing in alternative methods that better suit their needs for the future.[citation needed]

Corporate affairs

Eskom executives including Phakamani Hadebe (CEO), front row second from the left, and Jan Oberholzer (CTO), front row far left, at a 2019 public forum in Cape Town on Eskom’s financial situation.
In 2011 eight out of ten Eskom board members were controversially sacked by the Zuma administration.[18] From 2015 to 2017 the Zuma administration appointed Ben Ngubane as chairperson of the board. Brian Molefe was appointed by Zuma as Eskom CEO from April 2015 to November 2016. Molefe[89] and Ngubane’s[90] tenure was controversial for their involvement with the Gupta family and for allegedly allowing the company to become a vehicle for state capture.[91][92][93][94] Ngubane also controversially attempted to blacklist newspapers perceived as unfriendly to Eskom.[90] During parliament’s state capture inquiry in 2017 former Eskom chairperson Zola Tsotsi (2012–2015) testified that Gupta family member Tony Gupta made threats against Tsotsi allegedly stating that Tsotsi will lose his job as he was not ‘helping’ the Guptas.[95] In December 2016, Matshela Koko, former head of generation for Eskom, was named as acting CEO.[96] He resigned in 2018 after being implicated in awarding contracts to a company linked to his stepdaughter.[97] In early 2018, following the establishment of the Ramaphosa government, multiple members of the Eskom board and executive team were replaced by government due to allegations of corruption and mismanagement.[98]

Phakamani Hadebe was made acting CEO and director of Eskom in May 2018 as part of President Ramaphosa’s replacement of the company’s executive team.[99] A year into his term as CEO Hadebe resigned citing poor health and the difficult circumstances of the job.[100] His resignation sparked a debate amongst political parties over the difficult state of managing the financially strained state owned company[101] as well as the lack of political cover he was given to deal with labour unions and tackle corruption.[102] Six months after Hadebe’s departure, former Nampak Chief Executive[103] Andre de Ruyter was appointed CEO of Eskom.[104][105] De Ruyter’s appointment was criticised by the EFF[106] and factions within the ANC who instead wanted a black CEO appointed to the position.[107]

Financials
2008[108] 2009[108] 2010[109] 2011[109] 2012[110] 2013[110] 2014[111] 2015[111] 2016[112] 2017[112] 2018[113] 2019[114] 2020[1] 2021[1]
Revenue (R billion) 44.45 53.83 71.13 91.45 114.8 128.9 138.3 147.7 164.2 177.1 177.4 179.8 199.5 204.3
Operating profit (R billion) 1.53 −12.7 7.20 14.5 22.3 3.99 13.2 11.1 15.7 15.5 20.5 −1.77 4.41 6.68
Net income (R billion) −0.17 −9.71 3.62 8.36 13.2 5.18 7.09 3.62 5.15 0.88 −2.33 −20.7 −20.8 −18.9
Total debt (R billion) 50.68 74.18 105.9 160.3 182.6 202.9 254.8 297.4 322.7 355.3 388.7 440.6 483.7 401.8
Employee benefit expenses (R billion) 11.4 15.2 14.7 16.7 20.2 23.6 25.6 25.9 29.2 33.1 29.4 33.3 33.2 32.9
Number of employees 35,404 37,857 39,222 41,778 43,473 46,266 46,919 46,490 47,978 47,658 48,628 46,665 44,772 42,749
Electrical output capacity (GWh) 239,108 228,942 232,812 237,430 237,414 232,228 231,129 226,300 238,599 220,166 221,936 218,939 214,968 201,400
In 2018 and 2019 Eskom’s negative financial situation became serious as income outstripped liabilities and the company started experiencing trouble raising money to cover costs. For 72 hours between 26 March and 29 March 2019 it was reported that Eskom had run out of funds thereby threatening to negatively impact the broader South African economy. The situation was alleviated once Eskom secured a R3 billion commercial loan which was paid back on 2 April after the Reserve Bank disbursed R5 billion to Eskom through an emergency provision.[115] In July 2019 Eskom announced a loss of R20.7 billion due to the cost of servicing high levels of debt, the increased cost of primary energy and unpaid municipal debts.[116]

Debt
In late 2016, Standard & Poor’s Global Ratings downgraded Eskom’s credit rating further into subinvestment grade cutting its long-term credit rating to BB – two levels below the investment threshold.[117] By 2017 increasing levels of debt and corruption scandals effecting the company has led investment bank Goldman Sachs to declare Eskom as being the “biggest risk to South Africa’s economy.” The company had R413 billion in debt and planned to raise an additional R340 billion (US$26 billion) by 2022 thereby representing eight percent of South Africa’s GDP. R218.2 billion of the company’s debt consist of government guarantees.[118] Exacerbating the company’s financial situation was a recorded R3 billion worth of irregular expenditures in 2017.[101]

On 28 March 2018 Moody’s Investors Service downgraded Eskom’s credit rating to B2 from B1 stating that it was concerned with “the lack of any tangible financial support for the company in the February state budget”.[119]

On 24 November 2020, Moody’s further downgraded Eskom’s long-term credit rating to Caa1.[120] This places Eskom’s credit within the “speculative grade” of investment, with a “very high credit risk”.

Due to the company’s large size and important role as the region’s primary energy producer President Ramaphosa stated that Eskom was “too big to fail” as the reason why government had to continue to fund it despite its serious financial situation.[121]

Chinese debt
In July 2018 it was announced that Eskom had taken out a R33 billion loan from the Chinese government owned China Development Bank.[122] The loan conditions were controversially[123] not made public with accusations that it was an example of debt-trap diplomacy by China.[124] During the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into state corruption a senior Eskom executive stated that an additional R25 billion loan from the China-based company Huarong Energy Africa was improperly and controversially taken out by Eskom.[125] After the loan had been issued Eskom chairperson Jabu Mabuza stated to the Zondo Commission that Eskom would not be repaying the Huarong loan due to irregularities and corruption involved in the issuing of the loan.[126]

Controversies
Municipal debts
A number of South African municipalities are in significant arrears in paying Eskom for electricity supplied to them. The large amount owed to Eskom has caused significant controversy given the state utilities financial difficulties and repeated periods of load-shedding.[127] As of January 2020 South African municipalities owe Eskom a total of roughly R43 billion[128] (equivalent to US$2.88 billion).

Soweto
The single largest South African municipality to owe Eskom for unpaid electricity is Soweto which owes R13 billion[129] to R16.4 billion[128] in 2019. In response, Eskom initiated a process of cutting off electricity to debtors in the city, which resulted in violent public protests.[130][131] The city has a history of non-payment dating back to the 1980s when non-payment was used as a form of non-violent protest against apartheid era policies.[132] This is thought to have cultivated a culture of non-payment.[129]

Zimbabwe Power Exports
300MW of power are exported to Zimbabwe in a deal valued at US$2 million a month. At the end of November 2019 it was revealed that Zimbabwe owed $22 million in debt to Eskom (about 11 months in arrears). Eskom continues to supply Zimbabwe during times of load shedding, and exports power while switching the lights off at home.[133]

Power shortage: 2007 – ongoing
See also: South African energy crisis

An election poster referring to the Eskom energy crisis in the run up to the 2019 general election.
In the later months of 2007, South Africa started experiencing widespread rolling blackouts as supply fell behind demand, threatening to destabilise the national grid. With a reserve margin estimated at 8% or below,[134] such “load shedding” is implemented whenever generating units are taken offline for maintenance, repairs or re-fueling (in the case of nuclear units). From February 2008 to November 2014 blackouts were temporarily halted due to reduced demand and maintenance stabilization.[135] This drop in demand was caused by many of the country’s mines shutting down or slowing to help alleviate the burden.

Load shedding was reintroduced in early November 2014. The Majuba power plant lost its capacity to generate power after a collapse of one of its coal storage silos on 1 November 2014. The Majuba power plant delivered approximately 10% of the country’s entire capacity and the collapse halted the delivery of coal to the plant.[136] A second silo developed a major crack on 20 November causing the shut down of the plant again, this after temporary measures were instituted to deliver coal to the plant.[137]

2016, Eskom said that unplanned outages had been reduced In May 2016, former president Jacob Zuma said assurances had been given to him by Eskom management.[138]

In June 2018, there was Stage 1 load shedding along with a strike over wages.[138]

In February 2019, a new round of load shedding began due to the failure of coal burning boilers at some power stations due to poor quality coal. This resulted in long running periods of level 4 load shedding across the country in mid-March 2019, including night-time load shedding.[139] and promised to report back.[138] The situation at Eskom and resulting energy crisis became a political issue during the 2019 South African general elections.[140][141][142]

Sabotage
In December 2019, load shedding reached a new high as Eskom introduced stage 6 load shedding for the first time.[143][non-primary source needed] There was national outcry as Cyril Ramaphosa had left for Egypt during the crisis. He then returned to “solve” the problem, meeting on 11 December with the Eskom board. Ramaphosa then announced that there had been an element of sabotage involved, leading to the loss of 2000MW capacity. There was an immediate public outcry over this as people took to social media to blame incompetence as the cause and not the alleged sabotage that involved a switch that had allegedly been switched off, leading to a loss of the 2000MW capacity.[144]

On 19 November 2021, Eskom announced that an initial forensic investigation found evidence that recent damage to a coal conveyor at Lethabo was the result of deliberate sabotage. Steel supports had been severed, causing a power supply pylon to collapse.[145][146] In a media briefing, de Ruyter commented that the matter had been referred to the Hawks for further investigation.[147] In May 2022 the Minister for Public Enterprises, Pravin Gordhan, reported to Parliament that additional incidents of cables being cut intentionally by saboteurs, rising theft at its power plants, and corruption around the supply of fuel oil, had created greatly worsened the energy crisis and Eskom’s ability to resolve it.[148]

2017 corruption scandal
See also: Gupta family
Eskom was forced to suspend its Chief Financial Officer Anoj Singh in July 2017 when the Development Bank of South Africa threatened to recall a R15 billion loan if no action was taken against Eskom officials (including Singh) who were involved in corruption allegations involving the Gupta family.[101] In September 2017, Minister for Public Enterprises, Lynne Brown, instructed Eskom to take legal action against firms and individuals involved; ranging from Gupta family-owned consultancy firm Trillian Capital Partners Ltd. and consultancy firm McKinsey to Anoj Singh and acting Chief Executive Matshela Koko.

A report compiled by Eskom and G9 Forensic found that the two consulting firms including Gupta owned Trillian made R1.6 billion (US$120 million) in fees with an additional R7.8 billion made from future contracts.[149] An investigation done by the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism found that the Gupta family had received contracts worth R11.7 billion from Eskom to supply coal between 2014 and 2017. With pressure for Eskom to sign the first coal supply contracts with Gupta-owned entities being applied on the state-owned firm by then President Jacob Zuma.[150] In 2019 South African Special Investigating Unit launched an investigation into corruption related to the construction of the Medupi and Kusile power stations as a cause of repeated construction delays and project cost increases;[151] this led to the investigation of 11 contractors for allegedly stealing R139 billion (US$9.13 billion) from the projects.[151][152] In 2019, two senior Eskom managers and two business people were charged with fraud and corruption related to the construction of the Kusile power station.[153]

In January 2020 South African Minister for Public Enterprises, Pravin Gordhan, stated that cost overruns and corruption during the construction of Medupi and Kusile power stations was an important reason for the dramatic increase in Eskom electricity prices.[154]

Price increases
South African cents per kWh of electricity: 1994 to 2020[155]
The start of the South African energy crisis in 2007 is marked on the chart.
Eskom took out a number of loans to construct the additional capacity and significantly increased electrical tariffs by an average of 22% a year between 2007 and 2015 to in an attempt to offset costs.[156] In 2019 Eskom controversially applied to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) to increase tariffs by an additional 45% over the proceeding three years[157] arguing that it needs the increase in revenue to avoid a debt induced death spiral.[158] Eskom was controversially granted a 13.8% increase by NERSA in March 2019.[159] The South African civil society Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (OUTA) stated that by 2019 Eskom’s electrical tariffs had increased by 500% over the previous 11 years.[159] Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice and Dignity stated that the increased tariffs will exacerbate urban poverty negating increases to South Africa’s basic income grant.[160]

Eskom have again applied to NERSA for an urgent 17% increase in tariffs for 2019/2020 in an attempt to make up a R27.323 billion shortfall, Eskom is citing lower returns due to lower sales volumes as main reason for needing this price hike. The lower sales volumes is directly related to load shedding and Eskom’s failure to maintain capacity. The price hike application is open for public participation until 20 January 2020.[161] In NERSA has opposed an Eskom application to receive an additional R69 billion government bailout whilst Eskom is challenging NERSA’s denial of an additional price increase for 2020/21 of 16% instead of the 8.1% price increase already approved by NERSA.[162] During court proceedings with NERSA Eskom stated that this finances might collapse triggering a debt crisis for the South African government that has guaranteed Eskom’s debt.[163] Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan has stated that corruption and cost overruns during the construction of Medupi and Kusile power stations has resulted in a fourfold increase in electricity prices.[164]

An additional increase of 20.5% was approved by NERSA and announced by Eskom to take effect from 1 April 2022. This price raise was criticized by the mayor of Cape Town, Geordin Hill-Lewis as damaging to the economy and requested that it not be implemented.[165][166]

See also
Cahora Bassa (HVDC)
Eskom Centre
XMLVend
Hendrik van der Bijl – founder and first chairman of ESCOM (Eskom)
South African energy crisis
Notes
References
“Integrated Annual Report 2021” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 1 September 2021.
Sanchez, Dana (28 October 2014). “Which Countries Produce And Consume Most Electricity in Africa?”. Retrieved 28 October 2014.
“Electricity – production – Country Comparison – TOP 100”. indexmundi.com.
“Company information overview”. eskom.co.za.
“Eskom, Sasol Emit Over Half of South Africa’s Greenhouse Gas”. news.bloombergenvironment.com. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
“Eskom and Sasol fingered over ‘world’s second-worst sulphur dioxide hot-spot'”. BusinessLIVE. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
McKay, David (19 August 2019). “Greenpeace blames Eskom, Sasol for world sulphur hot-spot in SA’s Mpumalanga province”. Miningmx. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
Bloomberg. “South Africa is second-largest hotspot of sulfur dioxide emissions”. businesstech.co.za. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
“A South African company emits more sulfur dioxide than anyone in the power sector”. 7 October 2021.
Paton, Carol (7 February 2019). “Eskom to be split into three SOEs, Cyril Ramaphosa confirms in Sona”. businesslive.co.za. Retrieved 11 February 2019.
David McKenzie and Ghazi Balkiz. “US, UK and EU will help fund South Africa’s coal phaseout, offering a model for the developing world”. CNN. Retrieved 5 November 2021.
Holtzhausen, Jacobus Petrus (March 2012). “A comparative analysis of the coverage of the South African electrical energy crisis during the period 2005-2010 by Cape Town newspapers” (PDF). Stellenbosch University. Retrieved 21 December 2018.
Christie, Renfrew (1984). Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa. London: Macmillan. p. 5. ISBN 978-1-349-07032-9.
Conradie, S. R.; Messerschmidt, L. J. M. (2000). A Symphony of Power: The Eskom Story. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publishers. p. 77.
“Congella Power Station”. eskom.co.za. Retrieved 5 February 2019.
“South African Inflation Adjustment Calculator”. Retrieved 21 December 2018.
“Consumers must be protected from renewable energy pass through costs(Media statement by Matshela Koko, Eskom Group Executive for Generation)” (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 February 2017. Retrieved 29 January 2017.
Donnelly, Lynley. “Behind the Eskom purge”. The M&G Online. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
“Eskom defends SA’s nuclear aspirations | IOL”. 7 August 2016. Retrieved 3 April 2017.
“South Africa’s nuclear plans under reconsideration”. Nuclear Engineering International. 1 February 2018. Retrieved 4 February 2018.
Joffe, Hilary (5 March 2018). “No more steep tariff hikes for Eskom”. Business Day. Archived from the original on 5 March 2018. Retrieved 6 March 2018.
Mthethwa, Rebecca Davis and Ayanda (11 February 2019). “Dark days are here again: As Eskom buckles, anger rises…” Daily Maverick. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
Gosling, Melanie (13 February 2019). “Eskom and the multi-billion rand mega projects that could have saved SA”. Fin24. Retrieved 13 February 2019.
Mike Cohen and Paul Vecchiatto (5 June 2019). “How Eskom maimed SA’s entire economy”. Fin24. Retrieved 7 June 2019.
“Risk of South African economy hitting recession in 2019 high, says Moody’s”. Polity.org.za. Retrieved 7 June 2019.
Winning, Alexander. “South Africa’s Eskom cannot say how long latest power cuts will last”. nasdaq.com. Retrieved 15 July 2020.
“Eskom stage 2 load shedding starts on Sunday morning”. SABC News. 12 July 2020. Retrieved 15 July 2020.
Crompton, Rod. “Explainer: why South Africa’s energy generator is in so much trouble”. The Conversation. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
Department of Minerals and Energy (December 1998). White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (PDF) (Report). Department of Minerals and Energy. pp. 55–56. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 October 2021. Retrieved 29 October 2021.
Omarjee, Lameez (13 February 2019). “Eskom ‘technically insolvent’, won’t last beyond April 2019 – committee hears”. Fin24. Retrieved 14 February 2019.
Jones, Marc (21 February 2019). “Eskom support will weigh on South Africa’s finances – S&P Global”. SHARENET. Retrieved 22 February 2019.
“Daily life”, Measuring the Digital Transformation, OECD Publishing, 11 March 2019, pp. 192–193, doi:10.1787/b710d3da-en, ISBN 978-92-64-31198-5, S2CID 240623803
Niselow, Tehillah (13 February 2019). “Cosatu takes to the streets over Eskom, job losses. Here’s what you need to know”. Fin24. Retrieved 13 February 2019.
Duncan, Felicity (1 August 2019). “Eskom death spiral: Where’s the restructuring?”. BizNews.com. Retrieved 9 August 2019.
“Why the lights keep going out in South Africa”. BBC. 16 February 2019. Retrieved 9 August 2019.
Haffajee, Ferial (31 July 2019). “Reading the signs, Eskom’s death spiral is about to speed up”. Fin24. Retrieved 9 August 2019.
Winning, Alexander (30 July 2019). “South Africa’s Eskom facing “death spiral”: departing CEO”. finance.yahoo.com. Retrieved 9 August 2019.
“Eskom’s De Ruyter must either toe government’s line or ours – NUM”. Fin24. 18 December 2019. Retrieved 20 December 2019.
“Cosatu suggests an Eskom solution”. The Mail & Guardian. 13 December 2019. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
“EXPLAINER: The plan to bankroll Eskom with government employee pensions”. BusinessInsider. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
“Solidarity vows to fight Cosatu’s Eskom pensions rescue plan”. BusinessLIVE. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
Davie, Kevin. “Business Maverick: Union disunity holds up Cosatu’s Eskom bailout idea”. Daily Maverick. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
Shange, Naledi. “2,000 Eskom employees gone in a year, but 6,000 more must go to reach ‘right size'”. TimesLIVE. Retrieved 26 March 2021.
“Request Rejected”. eskom.co.za.
“ANKERLIG AND GOURIKWA GAS TURBINE POWER STATIONS” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 7 October 2010.[permanent dead link]
“Arnot Power Station”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 29 January 2016.
“Fact sheets with additional information” (PDF). Retrieved 29 January 2016.
“Camden Power Station”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 27 September 2011. Retrieved 6 January 2010.
“DUVHA POWER STATION”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 27 September 2011. Retrieved 8 January 2010.
Rod Hansen, Robbie van Rensburg (June 2006). “COST COMPARISONS BETWEEN ELECTROSTATIC PRECIPITATORS AND PULSE JET FABRIC FILTERS AND INHERENT CHALLENGES OF BOTH TECHNOLOGIES AT ESKOM’S 6 X 600 MW UNITS AT DUVHA POWER STATION” (PDF). International Society for Electrostatic Precipitation. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 July 2011. Retrieved 8 January 2010.
“Grootvlei Power Station”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 25 August 2010. Retrieved 9 January 2010.
“HENDRINA POWER STATION”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 25 August 2010. Retrieved 9 January 2010.
“World’s largest coal-fired power station. (Kendal Power Station in South Africa)”. BNET. November 1994. Retrieved 10 January 2010.[dead link]
“KENDAL POWER STATION”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 13 June 2010. Retrieved 10 January 2010.
“The Role of the State in the Energy Sector”. dme.gov.za. Archived from the original on 16 December 2007. Retrieved 13 January 2010.
“KRIEL POWER STATION”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 24 August 2010. Retrieved 10 January 2010.
“Coal-burning generating plant” (PDF). Eskom. Archived from the original (PDF) on 17 August 2011. Retrieved 7 October 2010.
“Work begins on Kusile power station”. Government of South Africa. 11 August 2008. Archived from the original on 8 March 2009. Retrieved 9 January 2010.
“CONSTRUCTION OF KUSILE POWER STATION GETS UNDERWAY”. Eskom. 5 August 2008. Archived from the original on 27 September 2011. Retrieved 9 January 2010.
“Consolidated interim results for the six months ended 30 September 2010” (PDF). Eskom. 23 November 2011. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 January 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2011.
“Supply status”. Archived from the original on 17 April 2015. Retrieved 24 March 2015.
“Eskom Supply status – week 47, 2013”. Archived from the original on 20 July 2014. Retrieved 4 December 2013.
“Lethabo Power Station”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 13 July 2009. Retrieved 11 January 2010.
“KAJUBA POWER STATION”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 16 September 2019. Retrieved 11 January 2010.
“Majuba Coal Fired Power Plant, South Africa”. Power Technology. Retrieved 2 March 2015.
“MATIMBA POWER STATION”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 18 November 2019. Retrieved 10 January 2010.
“MATLA POWER STATION”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 31 July 2020. Retrieved 10 January 2010.
“News on Renewable, Nuclear, Fossil, Technology, Market Data – Power Technology”.
“MEDUPI POWER STATION NEW RAW WATER RESERVOIR AND PIPELINES PROJECT VISUAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 7 October 2010.[permanent dead link]
“Tutuka Power Station”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 27 September 2011. Retrieved 11 January 2010.
“Drakensberg Pumped Storage Scheme” (PDF). Eskom. October 2005. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 October 2013. Retrieved 9 November 2008.
“GARIEP DAM”. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. Retrieved 6 January 2010.
“CASE STUDY OF INGULA AND LIMA PUMPED STORAGE SCHEMES” (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 May 2015. Retrieved 19 April 2015.
“Koeberg Power Station”. Archived from the original on 13 June 2020. Retrieved 6 April 2015.
“IAEA PRIS – Country Details – South Africa”. Retrieved 30 April 2015.
“Annual Report 2006 (Chapter 3)”. Eskom. Archived from the original on 3 January 2010. Retrieved 12 January 2010.
“Palmiet Pumped Storage Scheme”. International Hydropower Association. Archived from the original on 7 January 2009. Retrieved 7 January 2010.
“Palmiet Pumped Storage Scheme” (PDF). Eskom. October 2005. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 June 2011. Retrieved 9 January 2010.
“SA to get third wind farm”. South Africa: The Good News. 29 March 2009. Archived from the original on 9 May 2015. Retrieved 21 April 2010.
“Renewable Energy Projects”. Archived from the original on 24 August 2013. Retrieved 24 August 2013.
“Renewable Energy: Sere wind farm” (PDF). Retrieved 24 August 2013.[permanent dead link]
“Renewable Energy – Sere wind farm project”. eskom.co.za. Archived from the original on 21 December 2018. Retrieved 21 September 2015.
“ICNS Workshop 2019 – Global Aeronautical Distress & Safety System (GADSS): What You Need to Know”. 2019 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference (ICNS). IEEE: i. April 2019. doi:10.1109/icnsurv.2019.8735411. ISBN 978-1-72811-893-2.
“AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: Africa Investment Forum”. Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series. 55 (11): 22365B–22367A. January 2019. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6346.2018.08659.x. ISSN 0001-9852. S2CID 239401112.
“ICNS Workshop 2019 – Global Aeronautical Distress & Safety System (GADSS): What You Need to Know”. 2019 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference (ICNS). IEEE: i. April 2019. doi:10.1109/icnsurv.2019.8735411. ISBN 978-1-72811-893-2.
“Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr – The Integrated Resource Plan 2019: A promising future roadmap for generation capacity in South Africa”. www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
“South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan affirms coal power is set to be replaced by renewables”. Power Technology. 28 January 2021. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
“$11 Billion Green-Energy Initiative Takes Shape in South Africa”. Bloomberg.com. 16 September 2019. Retrieved 15 December 2019.
“Revealed! How Brian Molefe sabotaged SA’s world-class renewables industry”. BizNews.com. 2 February 2018. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
“Former Eskom chair Ben Ngubane ‘wanted papers blacklisted'”. businesslive.co.za. Retrieved 16 February 2019.
Chutel, Lynsey. “South Africa’s “state capture” corruption report claimed its first high-ranking casualty”. Quartz Africa. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
“Pityana to Molefe; ‘Foolishly opted to be state capture tool rather than instrument of democracy'”. BizNews.com. 27 February 2017. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
“Corruption Watch wants Molefe and former Eskom board members to never again be directors of an SOE”. TimesLIVE. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
“Molefe among Eskom, Transnet executives facing arrest in January”. citizen.co.za. Retrieved 26 December 2019.
le Cordeur, Matthew (22 November 2017). “Ex-Eskom chair Zola Tsotsi testifies how Guptas threatened him”. Fin24. Retrieved 16 February 2019.
“Matshela Koko takes reins at Eskom as acting CE”. Retrieved 3 April 2017.
“Eskom’s Matshela Koko resigns”. businesslive.co.za. 16 February 2018. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
“Gordhan appoints Phakamani Hadebe Eskom CEO in sweeping SOE board changes”. Fin24. 24 May 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2019.
“Gordhan appoints Phakamani Hadebe Eskom CEO in sweeping SOE board changes”. Fin24. 24 May 2018. Retrieved 14 January 2019.
Mkhawanazi, Siyabonga (26 May 2019). “Eskom head Hadebe quits ‘toxic’ job | IOL Business Report”. iol.co.za. Retrieved 29 May 2019.
Skiti, Sabelo; Cowan, Kyle; wa Africa, Mzilikazi (27 July 2017). “Eskom suspends Gupta-linked finance chief Anoj Singh”. TimesLive. Archived from the original on 27 July 2017. Retrieved 23 September 2017.
Donnelly, Lynley. “Eskom: The art of steering a sinking ship”. The M&G Online. Retrieved 29 May 2019.
“Goodwin, Frederick Anderson, (born 17 Aug. 1958), Chief Executive, Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 2000–08 (Deputy Group Chief Executive, 1998–2000); Senior Adviser, RMJM, 2009–11”, Who’s Who, Oxford University Press, 1 December 2007, doi:10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.17529
“Eskom CEO appointment met with surprise, scepticism”. Fin24. 18 November 2019. Retrieved 28 November 2019.
“Nampak’s Andre de Ruyter appointed as Eskom CEO”. Moneyweb. 18 November 2019. Retrieved 28 November 2019.
“EFF rejects de Ruyter’s appointment as Eskom CEO”. eNCA. Retrieved 28 November 2019.
Merten, Marianne. “ESKOM’S SURPRISE BOSS: Questions arise after new Eskom CEO is named”. Daily Maverick. Retrieved 28 November 2019.
“Integrated Annual Report 2009” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
“Integrated Annual Report 2011” (PDF). financialresults.co.za. Archived from the original (PDF) on 17 March 2012. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
“Integrated Annual Report 2013” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
“Integrated Annual Report 2015” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
“Integrated Annual Report 2017” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
“Integrated Annual Report 2018” (PDF). Eskom. Retrieved 21 December 2018.
“Integrated Annual Report 2019” (PDF). Eskom. July 2019. Retrieved 2 August 2019.
Merten, Marianne. “ANALYSIS: 72 hours in late March: When Eskom pushed South Africa to the edge of financial collapse”. Daily Maverick. Retrieved 25 April 2019.
KHUMALO, KABELO (31 July 2019). “Coal black cloud over Eskom’s big loss”. iol.co.za. Retrieved 2 August 2019.
“S&P’s downgrades South Africa’s Eskom further into junk territory”. Reuters. Archived from the original on 26 November 2016. Retrieved 3 April 2017.
Bonorchis, Renee; Burkhardt, Paul (22 September 2017). “Goldman Sachs sees Eskom as biggest risk to SA economy”. Moneyweb. Retrieved 23 September 2017.
Laing, Robert (29 March 2018). “Eskom’s credit rating blow”. Sunday Times. Archived from the original on 29 March 2018. Retrieved 31 March 2018.
“Rating Action: Moody’s downgrades Eskom’s ratings; maintains negative outlook”. Moody’s Investors Service. 24 November 2020. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
Chabalala, Jeanette (15 May 2019). “Eskom ‘too big to fail’ and won’t be privatised, Ramaphosa tells investors”. Fin24. Retrieved 10 August 2019.
Khumalo, Sibongile (24 July 2018). “Eskom inks R33.4bn loan deal with China Development Bank”. Fin24. Retrieved 2 January 2019.
Magubane, Khulekani (11 September 2018). “Terms of Chinese loan to Eskom still confidential, says Ramaphosa”. Fin24. Retrieved 2 January 2019.
Maqhina, Mayibongwe (29 October 2018). “Eskom urged to divulge R33bn loan terms with China bank | IOL News”. iol.co.za. Retrieved 2 January 2019.
“Eskom deceived SA Reserve Bank on R25bn Chinese loan, says senior company official”. businesslive.co.za. Retrieved 21 March 2019.
“#StateCaptureInquiry: Mabuza says Eskom won’t pay back R25bn Huarong loan | IOL News”. iol.co.za. Retrieved 21 March 2019.
“Soweto trends as Mzansi fumes about load-shedding: ‘They must pay for electricity'”. TimesLIVE. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
“Cosatu has a plan to save Eskom”. The Mail & Guardian. 29 January 2020. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
Check, Africa. “FACT CHECK: Does Soweto owe Eskom R18 billion in unpaid electricity?”. ewn.co.za. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
“Protests over power cuts disrupt morning traffic in Soweto”. News24. 3 February 2020. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
“‘Do not wait to get caught’: Eskom continues cutting power to non-paying users in Gauteng”. Fin24. 30 January 2020. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
Chaskalson, Matthew; Jochelson, Karen; Seekings, Jeremy (1987). “Rent Boycotts, the State, and the Transformation of the Urban Political Economy in South Africa”. Review of African Political Economy. 14 (40): 47–64. doi:10.1080/03056248708703748. ISSN 0305-6244. JSTOR 4005798.
Head, Tom (11 December 2019). “Zimbabwe Receiving “Uninterrupted Power Supply” from Eskom”. The South African. Archived from the original on 25 October 2020. Retrieved 8 November 2021.
Hartleb, Thomas (11 February 2008). “Expect Tight Energy Supply for Four Years”. Mail & Guardian. Retrieved 25 July 2016.
“Archived copy”. Archived from the original on 3 April 2017. Retrieved 3 April 2017.
Gibbs, JeVanne (4 November 2014). “Watch Majuba Power Station Seconds Before Silo Collapse (Video)”. The Citizen. Archived from the original on 11 December 2014. Retrieved 6 December 2014.
“Eskom admits another coal-storage silo at Majuba is cracked”. Business day live. 21 November 2014. Archived from the original on 11 December 2014. Retrieved 6 December 2014.
“Sunday Read: Load shedding through the years and how Eskom has struggled to keep the lights on”. Fin24. 24 March 2019.
Dlulane, Bonga. “Eskom load shedding at crisis levels, says energy expert”. ewn.co.za. Retrieved 19 March 2019.
“Eskom’s nine circles of hell, and election politics”. msn.com. Retrieved 1 April 2019.
Merten, Marianne (26 March 2019). “ANALYSIS: Eskom’s nine circles of hell, and election politics”. Daily Maverick. Retrieved 5 April 2019.
Modjadji, Ngwako (1 April 2019). “Eskom was told to keep the lights on at all costs until elections”. CityPress. Retrieved 5 April 2019.
Ltd, Eskom Hld SOC (9 December 2019). “We regret and sincerely apologise that stage 4 loadshedding will move to Stage 6 loadshedding as from 18:00 today, as a result of a shortage of capacity. This follows a technical problem at Medupi Power Station impacting additional generation supply”.
“Ramaphosa slammed after blaming sabotage for Eskom loadshedding crisis | IOL News”. iol.co.za.
Cowan, Kyle (19 November 2021). “Eskom finds evidence of sabotage at Lethabo Power Station – pylon supports were cut”. News24. Retrieved 19 November 2021.
Haffajee, Ferial (19 November 2021). “André de Ruyter: Deliberate acts of sabotage are causing power cuts”. Daily Maverick. Retrieved 19 November 2021.
Tshikalange, Shonisani (19 November 2021). “Eskom finds evidence of sabotage at Lethabo Power Station”. TimesLIVE. Retrieved 19 November 2021.
“Saboteurs threaten South Africa’s power supply”. TechCentral. 20 May 2022. Retrieved 23 May 2022.
Vecchiatto, Paul (22 September 2017). “Brown orders Eskom to take legal steps against companies in Gupta saga”. Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 22 September 2017. Retrieved 23 September 2017.
amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism (9 June 2017). “amaBhungane and Scorpio #GuptaLeaks: How Eskom was captured | Daily Maverick”. dailymaverick.co.za. Retrieved 23 September 2017.
“SIU probes R139 billion rot at Medupi and Kusile – report”. Fin24. 24 February 2019. Retrieved 9 August 2019.
HOSKEN, GRAEME (24 February 2019). “Eskom: R139bn theft probed”. TimesLIVE. Retrieved 9 August 2019.
“Former top Eskom managers appear in Joburg court on fraud, corruption charges”. Fin24. 19 December 2019. Retrieved 20 December 2019.
“Gordhan: You are paying 4 times more for electricity because of stealing at Medupi and Kusile”. Fin24. 22 January 2020. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
Labuschagne, Hanno (17 August 2020). “Eskom electricity prices – 1994 to 2020”. My Boardband. Retrieved 3 May 2022.
“Eskom’s shocking annual price hike since 2007”. businesstech.co.za. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
“Public hearing on Eskom’s plan for 45% increase over three years begins | Cape Argus”. iol.co.za. Retrieved 1 February 2019.
“How Eskom’s looming ‘death spiral’ is menacing SA economy”. Fin24. 6 December 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2019.
“Sunday Read: Electricity costs will rocket way beyond 13.8%. Here’s why”. Fin24. 10 March 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
KAILENE PILLAY AND SE-ANNE RALL (4 April 2019). “Eskom’s latest hike will ‘wipe out’ R80 grant increase”. iol.co.za. The Mercury. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
“Eskom tariff hike – Energy Expert Coalition”. Archived from the original on 15 December 2019.
Slabbert, Antoinette (5 January 2020). “‘SA bent over backwards for Eskom’: Nersa heads to court”. CityPress. Retrieved 6 January 2020.
“‘Forget about state capture’: Eskom warns of collapse without higher tariffs as it faces regulator in court”. Fin24. 15 January 2020. Retrieved 15 January 2020.
“Gordhan: You are paying 4 times more for electricity because of stealing at Medupi and Kusile”. Fin24. 22 January 2020. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
Zeeman, Kyle (23 January 2022). “More than 20,000 people sign DA’s petition to object to Eskom’s request for a 20.5% electricity hike”. TimesLIVE. Retrieved 27 January 2022.
“‘Outrageous’: Mayors slam Eskom’s proposed electricity hikes as unlawful and unjust”. www.msn.com. Retrieved 27 January 2022.
Further reading
Jaglin, Sylvy; Dubresson, Alain (2016). Eskom: Electricity and Technopolitics in South Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press. ISBN 978-1-77582-215-8.
External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Eskom.
Official website
Official Eskom Heritage website
Map of Power Stations
vte
Electricity delivery
vte
Power in South Africa
vte
National Key Points in South Africa

Authority control Edit this at Wikidata
Categories: Electric power companies of South AfricaGovernment-owned companies of South AfricaCompanies based in JohannesburgNuclear power companies of South AfricaCorruption in South Africa
Navigation menu
Not logged in
Talk
Contributions
Create account
Log in
ArticleTalk
ReadEditView history
Search
Search Wikipedia
Main page
Contents
Current events
Random article
About Wikipedia
Contact us
Donate
Contribute
Help
Learn to edit
Community portal
Recent changes
Upload file
Tools
What links here
Related changes
Special pages
Permanent link
Page information
Cite this page
Wikidata item
Print/export
Download as PDF
Printable version
In other projects
Wikimedia Commons

Languages
Afrikaans
Deutsch
Ελληνικά
Esperanto
فارسی
Français
Norsk bokmål
Polski
Svenska
Edit links
This page was last edited on 23 May 2022, at 09:20 (UTC).
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0; additional terms may apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.
Privacy policyAbout WikipediaDisclaimersContact WikipediaMobile viewDevelopersStatisticsCookie statementWikimedia FoundationPowered by MediaWiki
“Fact sheets with additional information” (PDF). Retrieved 2